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Nagel, Jackson, and Physicalism
by Sarah Huizar
 Physicalism is the assertion that the world is comprised solely 
of material matter. All things are grounded in physical truths, and governed by 
physical processes. Thus, everything, including mental states, can be described 
by purely objective means. Frank Jackson and Thomas Nagel are dissatisfied 
with this physicalist view of the mind. This is because it does not account for 
subjective experience, something that human beings universally and intuitively 
feel they have. To express this sentiment, Frank Jackson and Thomas Nagel 
each perform their own thought experiment, designed to bring attention to this 
“what it’s like” aspect of the mind and its functions. In this paper, I will discuss 
the physicalist view of the mind in greater depth before introducing Jackson and 
Nagel’s objections to it. A close examination of their thought experiments will 
reveal the significance of subjective experience to mental states. Ultimately, we 
will find that by appealing to our intuitive understanding of subjective 
experience, Jackson and Nagel have succeeded in exposing the inadequacy of 
the physicalist view of the mind.
In “The Nature of the Mind,” philosopher David Armstrong asks what it 
means to think, perceive, feel, and believe (Armstrong 259). He concludes that 
the answer to this question must be rooted in modern science, for it is the only 
field where people have consistently reached intellectual consensus on issues. 
Science is the only subject in which things can be certain, or at least very nearly 
so. For this reason, he asserts, we should use physical science, specifically 
molecular biology, to give a complete account of man and the mind in purely 
“physico-chemical terms” (Armstrong 260). This physicalist account of the mind 
is based on the view that the world is made solely of concrete, scientific facts. 
Man, accordingly, is nothing but a physico-chemical mechanism that reacts to 
this material world (Armstrong 260). Hence, physicalism seeks an objective 
definition of mental states based entirely on physical science. Armstrong states, 
“Thought…is something within the person which, in suitable circumstances 
brings about speech...I believe this is a true account of what we mean by a 
mental state” (262). The issue with this statement is that it disregards thought that 
does not result in action. It ignores the internal aspects of thought and feeling.  
Thought is not merely latent when it is not in “suitable circumstances,” for it is 
generally agreed that it does in fact feel like something to think, perceive, feel, 
and believe. That is, thought exists as an internal experience, even if it does not 
bring about action. The reason Armstrong’s conclusion is so dissatisfying is that it 
does not take into account this subjective aspect of mental states.
 Jackson expresses this subjective quality of mental states in his essay, 
“What Mary Didn’t Know.” In it, he asks us to consider a situation in which a girl, 
Mary, is confined to a black and white room her entire life. She is educated with 
black and white books and through lectures on a black and white television. 
Through this education, Mary learns all there is to know about every conceivable 
physical fact in the world, from every scientific discipline. Thus, she has complete 
knowledge of the material world (Jackson 320). This includes of course, the 
physical science behind vision, light, and color. A physicalist, Jackson explains, 
would claim that Mary knows everything there is to know. One day, Mary is 
released from the black and white room, and is exposed to color for the first time 
in her life. Jackson asserts what he believes to be an obvious and indisputable 
truth—that Mary has acquired new knowledge from this experience. She has 
acquired knowledge of the experience of others (Jackson 321). Though Mary had 
perfect knowledge of every physical fact, she had not experienced color as 
others had. Thus, while she had learned all about how the eye functions to 
perceive color, she only learned what it was actually like for others to perceive 
color when she was released from the room. In other words, Mary knew 
everything there was to know about color in scientific terms, but when she saw 
color for herself, she experienced something that she previously had no 
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knowledge of.  This “what it’s like” aspect can only be described as subjective 
experience. It cannot be defined in any objective or scientific way, yet it is still 
knowledge. If one is ignorant of this firsthand experience, then one lacks this 
particular piece of knowledge. Mental-states then, seem to have a subjective 
element that is not explained or allowed by a physicalist definition of the nature 
of the mind.
 To better understand the significance of subjective experience to true 
knowledge of mental states, it is helpful to try to imagine oneself in a body 
unlike one’s own. Nagel does this in his essay, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” 
Before introducing his thought experiment, Nagel explains that the real problem 
with physicalist theories is that they do not shed any light on the mind-body 
problem. That is, they do not even attempt to explain “the most important and 
characteristic feature of consciousness” (Nagel 311). Armstrong, when providing 
his definition of thought, said that it was “something within the person which, in 
suitable circumstances brings about speech” (262). As stated above, this does 
nothing to explain what thought is when it is not in suitable circumstances. 
Nagel goes on to explain that, at the most basic level, “the fact that an organism 
has consciousness means that there is something it is like to be that organism…
something it is like for that organism” (Nagel 311). Thus, to have consciousness 
is to have subjective experience. Nagel argues that, because the physicalist 
rejects subjective experience as necessary for a true understanding of the mind, 
we currently cannot conceive of what an explanation of the physical nature of a 
mental state would be (311). 
In order to further demonstrate the importance of this subjective 
experience to consciousness, Nagel employs the example of a bat. The bat, he 
believes, is a solid example because it is fundamentally different from us, yet we 
still believe that it has experience; there is something it is like to be a bat (Nagel 
312). We know bats use sonar, or echolocation as a form of perception that is 
very different from our own. We could learn everything there is to learn about 
sonar and about the bat’s anatomy and physical experiences. Just as Mary 
knows every physical fact about the world, we could know every physical fact 
there is to know about bats. We could even use all our knowledge of bats to try 
and imagine what it would be like for us to use echolocation, to have wings and 
webbed feet and a furry body. Would we know then, what it is like to be a bat? 
Nagel’s answer is no. I can imagine what it is like for me to be a bat, he says, but 
that does not tell me what it is like for a bat to be a bat (Nagel 313). Just as Mary 
lacks knowledge about the experience of those who have been exposed to color, 
we lack knowledge of the experience of bats. This knowledge that we lack has 
nothing to do with the physical world, or with scientific truths. It is knowledge 
based entirely in subjective experience. We can only understand things in terms 
of our own sensory perception. We cannot possibly know what it is truly like to be 
a bat so long as we are human. We have a wealth of scientific knowledge that 
can allow us to understand more about bats, but we will never understand what it 
is like to be a bat. Similarly, a true understanding of human mental states cannot 
be attained solely through study of physical processes, but must also be 
explained by subjective experience.
How then, could we understand the world to be entirely physical? 
Armstrong says in “The Nature of the Mind,” those who reject the view that we 
can give a complete account of man and his mental states in physical terms 
usually reject it for philosophical, or non-scientific reasons (259). But this is only 
because science is incapable of explaining subjective experience, a crucial 
property of the mental state. To this, Armstrong might respond by saying that we 
can reach no consensus on subjective experience, because it is different for all 
people. But the fact that our experiences are all different is precisely the point. 
And while it is true that we cannot reach any consensus on exactly what this 
“what it’s like” aspect is, we can reach an agreement that it is something we all 
have. Armstrong might then respond to the problem of subjectivity simply by 
asserting that we have no better way to reach any definitive conclusion about the 
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nature of man, which is the ultimate goal of studying the mind and mental 
states. He must consider though, that as attractive as finding one clear answer 
might be, the question of the nature of the mind might not be so simple. As 
Nagel so aptly puts it, “Philosophers share the general human weakness of 
explanations of what is incomprehensible in terms suited for what is familiar and 
well understood, though entirely different” (311). It is difficult for us to 
understand consciousness because it is so tied to subjective experience, which, 
by definition, cannot be understood in scientific terms. Although physical 
processes can help us understand mental states, they can only help us 
understand them to a point. Refusal to also acknowledge subjective experience 
yields an incomplete picture of the nature of the mind and mental states.
Armstrong acknowledges that science cannot tell us about God or 
morality or justice. Why then, should it be able to tell us about something as 
complex as consciousness, something that is so undeniably unique to every 
living thing that experiences it? In other words, the question of the nature of the 
mind may not have one simple truth. If the physicalist wants to employ scientific 
reason, he should ask a scientific question. Nagel and Jackson’s thought 
experiments do not deny that mental states cause behavior, and function to 
perform physical events. Rather, their experiments demonstrate that the human 
mind does more than this. Both experiments reveal the limitations of objective 
knowledge. If we are to gain a complete understanding of the nature of the 
mind, it is essential to look beyond science, and recognize that subjective 
experience cannot be separated from the mental state. Thus, physicalism can 
give neither a full account of the mind, nor an explanation of the true nature of 
man.
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! In this essay Sarah is careful to avoid a major pitfall of philosophy 
papers – an inadequate or burdensome summary – and instead takes multiple 
philosophical ideas to support an understanding and objection to the 
physicalist view of the mind. This paper is an exemplary model of a philosophy 
paper – summary, argument, counter-argument, conclusion – and incorporates 
each necessary aspect while presenting a clear and thorough understanding of 
the topics at hand. In incorporating summarized examples of both Nagel and 
Jackson’s arguments Sarah avoids a heavy handed summary and instead ties 
in her examples directly to the point she wishes to explore. This not only 
directs the reader to her purpose, but leaves the reader with a clear outline of 
where the paper is headed and how each philosopher’s arguments are taken 
into account in her objection. In analyzing the counter-argument to Jackson 
and Nagel,  Sarah gives adequate room to explain this point, yet leaves the 
reader with a clear sense of how this argument still presents dilemma’s to 
Jackson and Nagel. Overall, the essay is well balanced and incorporates a 
smooth underlying current along which the reader is drawn into the essay and 
gains a clear picture of both the objections and final conclusion Sarah makes.
-Tori Couch, Writing Center Consultant
